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FOUR CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

ERIc J. PAN*
I.

T

INTRODUCTION

regulation.
crisis represented a failure of
financial
global
HE recent
is not
to say that regulators and particular regulations
This
statement

caused the financial crisis; the events of the crisis stemmed from an array
of factors, including arguably short-sighted and reckless acts by both consumers and financial institutions. Rather, viewing the financial crisis as a
failure of regulation means recognizing that there existed regulatory responses and strategies that could have prevented or mitigated the factors
that contributed to the crisis.
Consider, for example, the five causes of the financial crisis identified
by the U.S. President's Working Group on Financial Markets: a breakdown
in underwriting standards for subprime mortgages and questionable lending practices to less qualified homebuyers; erosion of market discipline by
parties to the mortgage securitization process; flaws in credit rating agencies' assessments of subprime mortgages; risk management weaknesses at
large financial institutions; and failure by financial institutions to mitigate
these risk management weaknesses.] With respect to each one of these
causes, however, it is possible to identify corresponding regulatory failures.
The practice of selling subprime mortgages to homebuyers with poor
credit or insufficient income, for example, reflected the absence of adequate consumer protection and business conduct regulation. Regulators
could have helped address the risk management weaknesses at the large
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman
Center on Corporate Governance, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York,
New York. E-mail: epan@yu.edu. The author thanks the participants of the
Villanova University School of Law Symposium on Financial Regulatory Reform
and Universit6 Laval Trust Symposium, as well as various regulatory officials in
Brussels and Washington for helpful comments. The author also thanks Shriram
Bhashyam and Gabriella Zborovsky for invaluable research assistance.
1. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets is a working group
originally convened at the order of the President of the United States. See Exec.
Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1988). The working group consists of the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FINANcIAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE
PRESIDENT's WORKING GROUP (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
2000/gg00046.pdf; see also THE PRESIDENT's WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLIcY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at
https://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil03122008.
pdf.
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financial institutions if they exercised tougher prudential supervisory
oversight.2
Likewise, the lack of supervision of non-bank financial institutions,
such as investment bank holding companies, private equity funds, and
hedge funds, constituted a problem of under-regulation-in the sense
that no regulatory agency had complete responsibility for overseeing these
institutions. At the same time, the regulation of multi-function financial
supermarkets constituted a problem of overlapping regulation-in the
sense that these institutions were subject to oversight by multiple agencies,
none of whom coordinated their supervisory efforts with their counterparts. The failure of credit rating agencies to provide accurate and timely
ratings reflected the problems and challenges of regulating market gatekeepers, and the danger of relying on industry self-regulation and market
discipline to ensure appropriate conduct. Finally, the spread of the financial crisis from the United States to Europe and other regions of the world
exposed weaknesses in efforts by national regulators to share information
in a timely manner, cooperate in the supervision of international financial
firms, and coordinate regulatory responses. The crisis also exposed national regulators' loss of confidence in the principle of home country supervision of international financial firms.
TABLE

1

- FINANCIAL

CRisis

As REGULATORY FAILURE

ContributingFactors to FinancialCrisis

Predatory lending

Type of Regulatory Failure

Lack of consumer protection
regulation

Unsophisticated investors and
borrowers
Risk management weaknesses
Failure of credit rating agencies and
other market gatekeepers
Unregulated financial entities and
instruments
Financial supermarkets

Lack of consumer protection
regulation
Failure of prudential supervision
Failure of self-regulation
Under-regulation
Overlapping and competing
regulation and under-regulation

Cross-border financial contagion

Lack of international cooperation
and doubts concerning home country
supervision

Crisis response

Absence of market

2. Weakness of risk management is also a failure of corporate governance and
the disinterested nature of boards of directors toward the management of nonlegal risk. See generally EricJ. Pan, A Board'sDuty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
717 (2010); EricJ. Pan, Rethinking the Board'sDuty to Monitor: A CriticalAssessment of
the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://

ssrn.com/abstract=1593332.
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Recognizing the failure of regulation in preventing the recent financial crisis and the need to pursue more effective regulatory strategies,
policymakers in the United Kingdom, United States, and European
Union-the jurisdictions with the largest and most sophisticated financial
markets in the world-set forth concurrent proposals for substantial reform of their respective regulatory systems. The reforms emphasized the
reorganization of regulatory agencies and expansion of the powers of surviving agencies. While the unique political and economic circumstances
of each jurisdiction influenced the nature of the proposals, each aimed to
address the same problems that the crisis exposed. Despite their common
objectives, however, the proposals differed significantly from each other.
These differences should cause concern as they indicate that the reform
proposals-and any future proposals that fail to address such differencewill not be entirely successful in preventing future crises.
Successful financial regulatory reform must address four challenges.
First, how should regulatory systems be structured? Each jurisdiction must
consider how to divide responsibilities among regulatory agencies and
whether consolidation of such responsibilities in a smaller number of
agencies is desirable. Central to this challenge is determining how to ensure coordination between separate agencies and how to set regulatory
priorities when there are differences between agencies.
Second, should there be a separation of prudential supervision and
consumer protection regulation? Each jurisdiction must decide on the validity of the logic of the "twin peaks" model. Such logic states that there is
an inherent conflict between prudential supervision and consumer protection regulation and that such regulatory pursuits must be kept separate.
Proposals to create independent agencies focused exclusively on consumer protection appear to signal wider acceptance of the logic of twin
peaks in the United States and United Kingdom, but not elsewhere in the
European Union.
Third, which entity should be responsible for monitoring and managing systemic risk and what should be its powers? Systemic risk regulation
requires both the active monitoring of events and market developments
that may lead to market instability and the ability to impose corrective
action on the markets to contain systemic risk events. Given the broad
powers and responsibilities that must be vested in such a regulator, policymakers need to decide which agency is in the best position to assume this
role or, if more than one agency will be given the task, whether multiple
agencies can effectively share the responsibility and powers for systemic
risk regulation.
Fourth, how should cross-border financial services and transactions be
supervised and regulated? As aggressively as jurisdictions pursue financial
regulatory reform at home, they remain vulnerable to the effects of future
financial crises if there is inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions abroad. Unfortunately, cross-border regulation and super-
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vision remain limited and ad hoc. Part of the problem with cross-border
regulation and supervision is that the most common models of international regulatory coordination are not effective in addressing the types of
cross-border problems underscored by the recent financial crisis.3 Specifically, the challenge for the global financial system is not only the setting of
common rules and standards (i.e., the challenge of harmonization), but
also the continuous sharing of information, collaboration on supervision,
and implementation of technical standards (i.e., the challenge of cooperation). Furthermore, cross-border cooperation always will struggle with the
problems of prioritization of domestic concerns above international ones
and the legitimacy and accountability of international regimes. Many of
these problems, however, may be overcome if there is a new focus on bilateral arrangements, especially between the United States and European
Union, where there is greater commonality of interests and eventually the
development of stronger international regimes.4
This Article first outlines the main regulatory reform proposals set
forth in the United Kingdom, United States, and European Union. While
these proposals undoubtedly will change-or even be rejected-as a result
of political debate and the legislative process, this Article considers only
the original form of each proposal set forth in mid-2009. The proposals
represent each jurisdiction's clearest statement by its executive authority
as of early 2010 regarding the optimal strategy for financial regulatory reform. The Article then considers the four challenges to regulatory reform
and evaluates how each reform proposal addresses these challenges. The
Article explains that the proposals fail to answer the challenges. Given
their failure, the Article concludes that the reform proposals considered
by the United Kingdom, United States, and European Union are not going far enough to prevent future regulatory failures.
II.

PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY REFORM

In 2009, policymakers in the United Kingdom, United States, and European Union announced several proposals for the reform of their respective financial regulatory systems. 5 The following is a brief description of
each proposal.

3. See Eric J. Pan, The Challenge of InternationalCooperation and InstitutionalDesign in FinancialSupervision: Beyond TransgovernmentalNetworks, 11 CI. J. INT'L L.

(forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Pan, Challenge] (discussing failings of international financial architecture in managing financial crisis).
4. See id. at 31-42.
5. For a detailed description of the regulatory systems of the United Kingdom
and United States, see EricJ. Pan, StructuralReform ofFinancialRegulation, 19 TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Pan, Structural Reform], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333385.
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United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, three proposals put forward by the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), HM Treasury, and the opposition Conservative
Party dominated the national debate on financial regulatory reform. In its
March 2009 report known as the "Turner Review," the FSA recommended
broadening the agency's objectives and powers to allow it to play a bigger
role in the monitoring of systemic risk threats.6 The Turner Review noted
that the FSA failed to detect and prevent many of the activities that led to
the financial crisis because it did not believe it had to so intensively supervise some of the large U.K depository institutions or extend supervision
over certain unregulated financial institutions. As a result, the majority of
the report focused on improving the FSA's supervision of large banks and
non-bank financial institutions. Recommended improvements included
devoting more supervisory resources to systemically important firms-or
what some would call "too-big-to-fail" entities-hiring more skilled and
better trained regulatory personnel, and paying greater attention to credit
and liquidity risk. Specific report proposals included raising capital adequacy requirements for financial institutions and increasing the coverage
of deposit insurance, developing and enforcing U.K and international
codes for executive compensation, creating a central counterparty for
credit default swaps, and promulgating more stringent conflict of interest
rules for credit rating agencies. In terms of regulating cross-border financial institutions, the Turner Review not only advocated the use of colleges
of national supervisors, but also recommended that the FSA regulate more
stringently U.K. subsidiaries of non-U.K. financial institutions even though
such a move might subject international institutions to overlapping national regulation, hindering the provision of cross-border financial services. The Turner Review, however, did not recommend any changes to
the tripartite arrangement that has divided the responsibility for U.K. financial market regulation between the FSA, the Bank of England, and HM
Treasury.7 Rather, it recommended that together the FSA and Bank of
England should be given explicit responsibility for ensuring market stability, arguing that the FSA should be an equal partner of the Bank of En-

6. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY REGLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW],

SPONSE TO THE

available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf.
7. The tripartite arrangement refers to a division of responsibilities governed
by a memorandum of understanding between the Bank of England, the FSA, and
HM Treasury. Per the arrangement, the FSA would supervise banks and other
financial institutions, the Bank of England would serve as monetary authority and
the lender of last resort, and HM Treasury would provide public funding to the
markets. See HM TREASURY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BANK
OF ENGLAND, THE FINANCIAL SERVICEs AUTHORITY, AND HM TREASURY (last updated
Mar. 22, 2006)

[hereinafter TRIPARTITE MOU],

available at http://wvw.hm-

treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial-services/regulating-financial-services/fin
rfs mou.cfm.
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gland in monitoring and responding to systemic threats to the financial
system.
In July 2009, HM Treasury published its White Paper, "Reforming Financial Markets." 8 The HM Treasury White Paper generally endorsed the
recommendations of the Turner Review. The main question addressed by
the White Paper was whether the Bank of England should assume greater
prudential supervisory responsibility. If so, the Bank of England would
assume some of the powers previously reserved to the FSA. In agreement
with the FSA's view expressed in the Turner Review, HM Treasury recommended no changes to the old arrangement of shared responsibility between the FSA and the Bank of England. Rather, it sought to improve
coordination between the two agencies by establishing a formal Council of
Financial Stability composed of HM Treasury, the FSA, and the Bank of
England and chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Council
would replace the memorandum of understanding that governed the tripartite arrangement.9 The Council, however, would not have its own staff
or any independent policymaking authority.
Even after the publication of the Turner Review and HM Treasury
White Paper, which appeared to make similar recommendations, the future of the U.K. financial regulatory system remains uncertain. The Conservative Party issued its own report in July 2009 calling for an end to the
tripartite arrangement.1 0 Critical of the FSA's performance during the recent financial crisis, the Conservative Party advocated a shift in responsibility for all prudential supervision from the FSA to the Bank of England and
replacing the FSA with an agency focused exclusively on consumer protection. In effect, such a proposal would change the nature of the U.K system from that of a single regulator model, where the FSA is solely
responsible for financial regulation, to a twin peaks model, where the
Bank of England would be responsible for prudential supervision and the
new agency succeeding the FSA would be responsible for consumer protection regulation.
In May 2010, the Conservative Party formed a governing coalition
with the Liberal Democrats Party, forcing the Labour Party into opposition. In June 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrats government
announced that it would end the tripartite arrangement, offer legislation
to shift responsibility for prudential supervision to the Bank of England,

8. See HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming-financial markets080709.pdf.
9. See TRIPARTITE MOU, supra note 7.
10. See THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR
SOUND BANKING (2009), available at http://www.conservatives.com/News/News
20 0 9
7
stories/
ashx.

/0 /-/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/PlanforSoundBanking.
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and turn what remains of the FSA into the new Consumer Protection and
Markets Authority."
B.

United States

The U.S. Treasury Department's White Paper on Financial Regulatory
Reform, issued in June 2009, laid out President Barack Obama's Administration's plan to reform the U.S. financial regulatory system. 12 The
Obama White Paper recommended reforms in five areas: (1) supervision
and regulation of financial institutions; (2) regulation of financial markets; (3) consumer and investor protection; (4) resolution authority over
bank holding companies and other large financial institutions; and (5)
international regulatory standards and cooperation.
In terms of supervision and regulation of financial institutions, the
Obama White Paper called for the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council, composed of the heads of each federal financial regulatory
agency. The Council would replace the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets. Furthermore, the Council would have a permanent
staff and hold regular meetings, suggesting that the Council would be independent of existing federal agencies and play a leading role in coordinating regulatory initiatives across federal agencies. The Obama White
Paper also tackled the problem of institutions that are too-big-to-fail by
recognizing a new category of financial institutions called "Tier 1 Financial
Holding Companies" (Tier 1 FHC). While under the current system only
depository institutions are subject to prudential supervision by the federal
banking agencies, any financial institution may be deemed a Tier 1 FHC
under the Obama White Paper.13 All Tier 1 FHCs would be subject to
consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve, tighter capital adequacy
requirements, and higher risk management standards.
In terms of reorganizing the regulatory system, the Obama White Paper's recommendations were quite modest. It sought to combine the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and Office of Comptroller of the
11. See Rt Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at
The Lord Mayor's Dinner for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London (June
16, 2010), available at http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_I0.htm; Mark Hoban MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Statement to the House of Commons
on Reforming the Institutional Framework for Financial Regulation (June 17,
2010), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement-fst_170610.htm.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

(2009), available

at http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
13. Four federal agencies share responsibility for the supervision of banks.
The Federal Reserve supervises bank holding companies and certain statechartered banks that have elected to be regulated by the Federal Reserve. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises all federally chartered national banks. The Office of Thrift Supervision regulates federal savings associations. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation oversees the national deposit
insurance system and supervises, in conjunction with state banking regulators,
state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.
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Currency (OCC) into a new, single national bank supervisor. The other
regulators of depository institutions would remain intact. Supervision of
state-chartered banks would continue to be the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
Obama White Paper further proposed creating a new Office of National
Insurance to monitor, but not regulate, the insurance industry.
The Obama White Paper's other significant proposal was the creation
of a new, stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). Excluding investment services already regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), the CFPA would regulate the manner in which financial institutions sell credit, savings, payment, and other financial products to consumers. Equally important, the powers of the CFPA would cross institutional
lines, allowing the CFPA to impose requirements on depository and nondepository financial institutions. The CFPA also would have supervisory
and enforcement authority, making it truly independent from the federal
prudential supervisors.
It should be noted that the Obama White Paper represented the second major attempt in two years to reform the U.S. financial regulatory
system. In March 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, serving under
President George W. Bush, put forward the ambitious Blueprint for a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure. 1 4 The Paulson Blueprint began as an attempt to rethink the regulation of U.S. financial markets in
order to make them more competitive relative to foreign financial markets.15 As the financial crisis worsened, the focus of the Paulson Blueprint
changed to address growing public concerns about the effectiveness of the
U.S. regulatory system.1 6 Congress, however, never seriously considered
the recommendations of the Paulson Blueprint, and Secretary Paulson admitted that many of the recommendations of the Blueprint would take
years to implement. By late 2008, the outgoing Bush administration was
not in a position to push for such an ambitious overhaul of the U.S. regulatory system.17
14. See U.S.
REGULATORY

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
[hereinafter PAULSON BLUEPRINT], available at

STRucruRE (2008)

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.

15. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Paulson Announces Next
Steps to Bolster U.S. Markets' Global Competitiveness (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp476.htm (announcing second stage of
Treasury Secretary's capital markets competitiveness plan to produce blueprint for
reformed U.S. financial regulatory structure).
16. The Paulson Blueprint, for example, provides a number of short-term recommendations aimed at addressing the downturn in the credit and mortgage markets. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 5.
17. See, e.g., Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, US. Bank Rules Reform Seen but
Paulson Blueprint Doubted, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/innovationNews/idUSN2337728820080824?sp=true.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/7

8

Pan: Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform

2010]

CHALLENGES To

FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

751

The Paulson Blueprint, however, anticipated many of the regulatory
challenges later identified by the Obama White Paper and offered more
aggressive solutions to address these challenges. In particular, the Paulson
Blueprint tackled the problem of trying to supervise financial supermarkets that did not neatly fall within the categories of banking, securities,
and insurance. The Blueprint advocated an "objectives-based approach"
where regulatory agencies would be organized in accordance with the relevant regulatory objective (e.g., market stability, safety and soundness, and
consumer protection).18 The Paulson Blueprint recognized the inefficiency of having multiple federal agencies compete to regulate the same
type of financial institutions. Such complexity over-regulated certain firms
and left other firms under-regulated. Furthermore, the Paulson Blueprint
sought to strengthen consumer protection by separating the regulation of
business conduct from prudential regulation. As a result, the Paulson
Blueprint proposed consolidating the responsibilities of most existing federal agencies into two super-agencies, a Prudential Financial Regulator
and a Business Conduct Regulator. The Blueprint also envisioned giving
explicit powers to the Federal Reserve to be a market stability regulator.
The reforms put forward by the Obama White Paper were comparatively
much more modest.19
C.

European Union

In November 2008, the European Commission tasked an expert panel
chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, a senior official of the French Treasury,
18. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 137-46.
19. After presentation of the Obama White Paper, members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate passed their own bills concerning reform of the
U.S. financial regulatory system. The House of Representatives passed the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2009) [hereinafter House Bill]. The House Bill recommends, among other
things, the creation of an interagency Financial Services Oversight Council to oversee systemic risk regulation and the formation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency. In May 2010, the Senate passed a bill introduced by Senator
Christopher Dodd. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217,
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Senate Bill]. The Senate Bill seeks to create an
interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council to monitor systemic risk and delegation of responsibility for the supervision of systemically important non-bank
financial institutions to the Federal Reserve Board. Unlike the House Bill, the
Senate Bill rejects any move to create an independent consumer financial protection agency and instead conceives of a consumer protection office established
within the Federal Reserve System. It is helpful to note that the Senate bill differs
significantly from an earlier proposal put forward by Senator Dodd in November
2009. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, S., 111th Cong. (Discussion Draft 2009). Senator Dodd's first proposals would have consolidated all
prudential supervisory authority into a single agency, the Financial Institutions
Regulatory Administration, as well as created a separate, single consumer protection agency. The Senate bill under consideration in 2010 retained all existing prudential supervisory bodies, except for OTS. As of June 2010, a bipartisan
conference committee was still debating the reconciliation of the House and Senate Bills.
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20
The
to study possible reforms of the EU financial regulatory system.
panel's mandate was to consider the weaknesses in European supervision
of financial institutions that were revealed by the financial crisis and to
recommend improvements to the EU financial supervisory system.2 1 The
panel issued its report in February 2009, and the European Commission
endorsed the de Larosiere Report in March 2009, announcing in May
2009 a desire to implement the de Larosiere recommendations. 22 In September 2009, the European Commission proposed legislation to create
two new European bodies: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS).23

20. See Press Release, European Comm'n, High Level Expert Group on EU
Financial Supervision to Hold First Meeting on 12 November (Nov. 11, 2008),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/
1679.
21. See id.
22. See THE DE LAROSItRE GROUP, REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FiNANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009) [hereinafter DE LAROSItRE REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/president/pdf/statement_200902
25-en.pdf; see also COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FOR
THE SPRING EUROPEAN COUNCIL: DRIVING EUROPEAN RECOVERY (2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/president/pdf/press_20090304_en.
pdf; COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/
COMMUNICATION],
MAY
finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication may2009/C-2009_715
en.pdf.
23. See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DECISION ENTRUSTING THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK WITH SPECIFIC TASKS CONCERNING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (2009), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/finances/docs/committees/supervision/
20090923/com2009 500_en.pdf; COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING
DIRECTIVES 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC,
2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, AND 2009/65/EC IN RESPECT OF THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORITY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND
MARKETS AUTHORITY (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/
COMM'N OF THE
finances/docs/committees/supervision/20091026_576_en.pdf;
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN
SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009
503_en.pdf; COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON COMMUNITY MACRO PRUDENTIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN SYSTEMIc

RISK

BOARD

(2009),

available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/

finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_499_en.pdf;
COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EuROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN BANKING AuTHORITY (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/finances/docs/
committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_50len.pdf; COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENAUTHORITY
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/
finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_502_en.pdf.
SIONs
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The ESRB would be responsible for monitoring and identifying systemic risks that may adversely affect the EU financial markets. Before the
creation of the ESRB, each individual EU member state handled systemic
risk regulation, but the de Larosiore Report noted that national regulators
were ill-positioned to identify systemic risk events that originated outside
their jurisdictions. 24 The ESRB would carry out an information gathering
function, having no powers of its own to respond to systemic risk threats. 2 5
Instead, the ESRB would issue recommendations to member states and
expect the member states to pursue the correct course of action or explain
why they ignored the ESRB's recommendations.26 Central bankers also
would dominate the ESRB. The European Commission concluded that
central banks are in the best position to be systemic risk regulators, given
their experience and expertise in monitoring economic trends to effect
monetary policy. 27 The European Commission recognized the importance of giving the ESRB access to information about financial institutions
and financial markets. 28 Therefore, senior representatives of the national
supervisory authorities would be invited to attend ESRB meetings as observers. Full members of the ESRB would include the President and Vice
President of the European Central Bank, a representative of the European
Commission, and the chairmen of the various European Supervisory Authorities that compose the ESFS.
The ESFS, on the other hand, would be responsible for coordinating
the supervision and regulation of individual financial institutions. The
ESFS would be composed of three European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs): the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities and Markets Authority. These authorities would replace the current Committees
of Supervisors, such as the Committee of European Securities Regulators,
established as part of the Lamfalussy process.2 9 Like the Committees of
Supervisors, the ESAs would continue to serve as coordinating bodies for
national regulators, working to harmonize rules and standards across
24. See DE LAROSIPRE REPORT, supra note 22, at

39-40.

25. It should be noted, however, that the President of the European Central
Bank (ECB) is the chair of the ESRB, and the ECB does have some direct power to
intervene in the financial markets.

26. The requirement on member states to justify their rejection of an ESRB
recommendation represents adoption of the "comply-or-explain" strategy used in
the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions. Such strategy places a reputational
burden on the non-complying party as they have to explain their reasons for disagreeing with the recommendation. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Perilof
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1803, 1864-65 (2008) (describing
comply-or-explain regulation strategy).
27. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION MAY COMMUNICATION, supra note 22, at 6.
28. See id.
29. See THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men-en.pdf.
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member states. In addition, the European Supervisory Authorities would
have new powers to collect information, issue binding technical standards,
and assume supervisory responsibility for certain financial institutions that
operate across the European Union.3 0 Membership in the European Supervisory Authorities would remain the same as that of the Committees of
Supervisors.
The principle behind the creation of ESRB and ESFS is to facilitate
coordination and develop common standards of financial regulation
among the member states. The regulatory reforms proposed by the de
Larosibre Report and the European Commission are consistent with the
European Union's long standing desire to encourage harmonization of
rulemaking and standards-setting at the European level. To this end, the
ESRB and ESFS, as envisioned by the de Larosibre Report, represent a
substantial shift in regulatory power away from member states and to the
European Union. While member states may retain direct powers over
their markets and local financial institutions, these EU-level bodies would
limit member states' abilities to effect regulation that is not first discussed
or debated at the EU-level. As a result, the implementation of the de
Larosiere Report recommendations offers an important model for how
cross-border regulation and supervision may be conducted.
III.

FOUR CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

The three jurisdictions have taken quite different approaches toward
financial regulatory reform. One explanation for the differences is politics. In the United Kingdom, for example, the FSA is closely associated
with the current Labour Government, having been one of the first legislative achievements of the Labour Government after its assumption of
power in 1997.31 The Conservative Party, however, has felt free to challenge the competency of the FSA and to advocate the agency's abolishment. In the United States, the Obama Administration prepared its White
Paper with the expectation of having difficulty attaining congressional approval of implementing legislation. As expected, various parts of the
White Paper have been attacked by both right and left leaning members of
Congress. 3 2 The Obama Administration also faced the problem of win30. The ESAs are also more powerful than their predecessors, the Committee
of Supervisors, in two respects. First, while decision-making in the Committee of
Supervisors was by consensus, decision-making in the ESAs will be by Qualified
Majority Vote (QMV). The introduction of QMV will greatly enhance the reach of
the ESA's rulemaking powers. Second, the proposed legislation has included a
dispute resolution provision to resolve disagreements between national regulators.
31. See Eilis Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the
Single Financial RegulatorModel, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-72 (2003).
32. See House Bill, supra note 19; Senate Bill, supranote 19. Several provisions
of the Obama White Paper had been dropped to appease some congressional opposition. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, White House Pares Its FinancialReform Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 24, 2009, at Bl (describing elimination of proposal to require financial services companies to offer certain basic products to consumers).
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ning congressional support for its reform proposal while seeking congressional support for a number of its other major legislative initiatives-most
notably health care reform. As a result, the Obama White Paper can best
be described as a product of political realism rather than an ideal
roadmap for financial regulatory reform. Finally, the European Union remains limited by its ever-present challenge of balancing expansion of EUlevel institutions with the sovereign interests of its member states.3 3
Another explanation is that each jurisdiction approached regulatory
reform from different assumptions about the best way to regulate the financial markets. The United Kingdom already had in place a single financial regulator and a central bank focused on setting monetary policy.
Therefore, the focus of the reform debate in the United Kingdom was on
the relationship between the FSA, the Bank of England, and HM Treasury,
and on the sharing of prudential supervisory responsibility between the
FSA and Bank of England.
In contrast, the United States has had a regulatory system where
power is divided among federal and state agencies and, at the federal level,
among several federal agencies. A state-chartered bank could be subject
to supervision by its home state bank regulator as well as by the FDIC or, if
it so chooses, the Federal Reserve. In addition, regulatory agencies divided up responsibility amongst themselves based on the type of activity
carried out by the type of institution.34 For example, one group of agencies would regulate banks, another agency would regulate securities firms,
a third group of regulators would regulate insurance providers, and so
forth. Thus, reform of the U.S. regulatory system means changing years of
regulatory practice and challenging entrenched institutional interests.
The European Commission has a relatively blank slate as the current
EU-level financial regulatory institutions are in their infancy, but it is still
constrained by the fact that it must ensure the EU-level framework is compatible with the regulatory systems of the various member states. Some
member states follow a single regulator model; others follow a twin-peaks
approach.3 5 Some states have complex financial regulatory systems, reflecting the advanced nature of their financial markets; other states have
less advanced regulatory frameworks. Thus, the European Union must
have a regulatory framework flexible enough to respect the different national systems of regulation and the characteristics of the various European markets.
The most important explanation of why the United Kingdom, United
States, and European Union have adopted different approaches to regulatory reform, however, is that the jurisdictions disagree regarding how to
33. See Charlemagne: Summertime Blues: Why the Atmosphere in Brussels Seems So
Glum, THE EcoNOMisT, Aug. 29, 2009, at 47 (noting growing resistance by member

states to relinquish greater authority to European Union).
34. See Pan, StructuralReform, supra note 5, at 20-21.
35. See, e.g., id. at 29-50.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw

756

[Vol. 55: p. 743

respond to the four basic challenges to financial regulatory reform-determining: (1) how should regulatory systems be structured; (2) should
there be a separation of prudential supervision and consumer protection
regulation; (3) which entity should be responsible for monitoring and
managing systemic risk and what should be its powers; and (4) how should
cross-border financial services and transactions be supervised and
regulated?
A.

Structure of FinancialRegulatory Systems

Each proposal recommended some reorganization of the jurisdiction's previous regulatory structure. HM Treasury in the United Kingdom
proposed a new Council for Financial Stability to manage the relationship
between the FSA and the Bank of England. The opposition Conservative
Party advocated the shifting of supervisory responsibility from the FSA to
the Bank of England, and the subsequent replacement of the FSA with an
agency focused entirely on consumer protection. The Obama White Paper argued for consolidation of the smaller federal bank regulatory agencies, OCC and OTS, the creation of a consumer financial protection
agency, and the establishment of an office within the Treasury Department focused on monitoring state insurance regulation and negotiating
international agreements on insurance. The European Commission
sought to create a new EU-level committee focused on providing systemic
risk oversight and to reorganize EU-level prudential regulators into more
powerful European financial supervisors for securities, banking, and
insurance.
In a previous article, I argued that the key characteristics of an optimal regulatory system are efficiency, accountability, competency, and legitimacy.3 6 We want our regulatory system to be efficient in its collection of
information and allocation of regulatory resources. We want our regulatory system to be accountable for regulatory failures. We want our regulatory system to be competent in managing regulatory problems. Regulators
must have the necessary expertise and experience in the areas they are
being asked to regulate. And we want our regulatory system to be legitimate in the eyes of the market actors who the regulators must monitor
and influence.
The organization of the regulatory system plays a significant role in
determining the characteristics of the regulatory system. Any decision to
reorganize a regulatory system must take into account two factors. The
first factor is whether the arrangement of existing agencies suits their regulatory responsibilities. An agency's existence must serve a particular regulatory purpose. Unnecessary or duplicative agencies should be
eliminated or pared back, and new agencies should be established, or old
agencies expanded, where there are gaps in the regulatory system. This
line of inquiry is particularly apt when considering a complex regulatory
36. See id. at 11-14.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/7

14

Pan: Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform

2010]

CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

757

system like that of the United States' where several agencies share responsibility for supervising banks and have similar objectives. In such cases,
consolidation of agencies may be desirable as it is often inefficient to have
competing regulators serve the same "clients." Similarly, reducing the
number or size of agencies may be problematic if it reduces regulatory
coverage. The remaining agencies must be ready to accept broader responsibilities to achieve complete oversight.
The second factor is whether multiple agencies have adequate resources. Resources refer not only to budget and personnel, but also to
access to information. The danger of dividing regulatory responsibility
among several agencies is that a single agency may find itself underresourced, limiting its ability to accomplish its regulatory mission. Thus,
even when multiple agencies share responsibility for regulating the same
institutions or market areas, giving the impression of sufficient regulatory

oversight, it may be the case that no agency has the capability to carry out
its regulatory responsibilities in an effective manner or, in an attempt to
conserve resources, defines its lines of responsibility too narrowly (i.e., regulatory myopia), exacerbating the problem of inadequate regulatory coverage noted earlier.3 7
In general, consolidation of regulatory agencies is desirable. Fewer

agencies mean better allocation of resources and fewer opportunities for
regulatory gaps. But how far should jurisdictions pursue consolidation?
The extreme case is the single regulator model, epitomized by the United
Kingdom's FSA. 3 8 A single regulator is attractive because there is no divi-

sion of resources or regulatory responsibility among smaller regulatory
agencies.3 9 As the U.K. experience with the FSA shows, however, a single
regulator may just internalize many of the problems faced by a more fragmented regulatory system. 40 Discussions concerning allocation of resources and setting of regulatory priorities shift from the public sphere to
37. It should be noted that smaller agencies may have some advantages. One
can argue that smaller agencies are more competent in carrying out their duties
because of their narrower focus and, consequently, deeper expertise, or that they
are more vigorous regulators because of competitive pressure from other agencies.
See Richard J. Rosen, Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regulators in Banking, 35 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 967 (2003) (arguing for benefits of bank regulator
specialization).
38. Among European countries, Norway, Iceland, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, and Hungary also have single regulators. See
Donato Masciandaro, Unification in FinancialSector Supervision: The Trade-off Between
Central Bank and Single Authority, 12 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 151, 152 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Clive Briault, Revisiting the Rationalefor a Single NationalFinancial
Services Regulator, 16 FSA OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 16 (2002), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/OP1 6.pdf.
40. The FSA's internal audit of its supervision of Northern Rock revealed that
business units within the FSA operated independently of each other and failed to
share information with more qualified personnel in other business units. This lack
of coordination contributed to the FSA's failure to understand the risks associated
with Northern Rock's operations prior to Northern Rock's request for emergency
liquidity assistance. See FINANCIAL SERVICEs AUTHORITY, INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION,
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the private sphere within the single regulator, reducing transparency and
limiting public oversight.
Consolidation is most beneficial when it eliminates the silo or institutional approach to regulating financial institutions. In the institutional
approach, multiple regulatory agencies exist to oversee particular categories of financial institutions. For example, a jurisdiction may have one
group of regulatory agencies overseeing securities firms, another group
overseeing banks, and a third group overseeing thrifts. This approach,
however, has proven out-dated as many financial firms pursue a variety of
financial services and activities that defy the traditional categories of securities, banking, and insurance. 4 1 As a result, consolidation is necessary because existing regulatory agencies no longer match the types of financial
institutions they are supposed to be supervising. Consequently, they often
find themselves working at cross-purposes to their sibling agencies.
In this respect, both the U.S. and EU approaches are lacking. The
Obama White Paper does not go far enough in pursuing regulatory consolidation. The U.S. system continues to follow an institutional regulatory
approach, leaving intact a multitude of regulatory agencies that are regulating different institutions, but the same type of financial activity. The
Obama White Paper's attempt to address the problem of large financial
supermarkets can be best described as a "sweep under the rug" strategy
where the largest of such institutions are given special status as Tier I
FHCs and then subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve. Aside from
the issue of whether the Federal Reserve is the best agency to supervise
these financial institutions, the White Paper does not justify the need for
additional prudential supervisors if the Federal Reserve can successfully
carry out complete supervision of the largest and most complex financial
institutions. Why should institutions that fall below the definition of Tier
1 FHCs still be regulated by other agencies and, for that matter, multiple
agencies?
Adherence to the institutional approach also undermines the effectiveness of the EU reform proposal. The European Union continues to
divide regulatory responsibility along the lines of a securities supervisory
authority, a banking supervisory authority, and an insurance supervisory
authority. The European Union should instead consider a single European Supervisory Authority and eliminate narrow regulatory approaches.
B.

Logic of Twin Peaks

The second challenge that the regulatory reform proposals must address follows directly from the question of the optimal number of regulaTHE SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN Rocie A LESSONs LEARNED REVIEW
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr-report.pdf.

(2008), available

41. See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and the Management and
Regulation ofFinancialInstitutions,19J. BANKING & FIN. 461, 466-69 (1995) (discussing meaninglessness of institutional categories due to financial innovation).
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tory agencies. If policymakers consider reducing the number of
regulatory agencies to improve efficiency, accountability, and legitimacy,
should prudential supervision and consumer protection be handled by
separate agencies? At issue is whether we should accept the logic of twin
peaks. Twin peaks refers to the view best put forward by Michael Taylor,
who asserted that the optimal regulatory structure is two separate agencies, one focused on prudential supervision and regulation and another
42
The
focused on consumer protection and business conduct regulation.
regulalogic is that there is a fundamental difference between prudential
tion and those of consumer protection regulation-differences that encourage a separation of the two regulatory activities. In the case of
prudential regulation, the regulator pursues a cooperative relationship
with the financial institution. The regulator's role is to assist financial institutions in protecting their financial condition. It sets standards and
monitors the maintenance of those standards by the financial institution.
To the extent a financial institution fails to meet certain standards or the
regulator identifies a possible threat to the safety and soundness of the
financial institution, the regulator's task is to raise its concerns with the
institution and work with the financial institution to identify and implement a solution. In contrast, a consumer protection regulator is primarily
in an adversarial position relative to financial institutions. The regulator's
role is to protect consumers and investors against the financial institutions.
Consequently, the regulator uses its rulemaking powers to impose new requirements on financial institutions and its enforcement powers to discipline and punish financial institutions for conduct violations. These
differences require prudential and business conduct regulators to invoke
different strategies and approaches, justifying the separation of prudential
supervision and consumer protection into different agencies.
The alternative to the twin peaks model is where the same regulators
handle prudential supervision and consumer protection. A single financial regulator represents the ultimate consolidation of both prudential supervision and consumer protection responsibilities in the hands of a single
agency. Assuming there is no separation of the two regulatory functions in
the internal structure of the agency, the single regulator model represents
a rejection of the logic of twin peaks.
The question of whether the logic of twin peaks is valid arises in the
U.S. and U.K. proposals to create standalone agencies dedicated to consumer protection. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party recommended that the FSA be replaced with a consumer protection agency. In
the United States, the Obama White Paper proposed the creation of the
CFPA. The call for stronger consumer protection regulation stems from
lessons drawn from the recent financial crisis. The housing price bubble

42. See HowARD

DAvIEs

& DAVID

GREEN, GLOBAL FINANcIAL REGULATION

191-

94 (2008); see also Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structurefor the New Cen-

tury, (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, Working Paper, 1995).
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resulted in part from widespread access by consumers to cheap mortgage
products, such as adjustable rate mortgages with low teaser interest rates.
At the same time, the widespread availability of inexpensive credit encouraged high levels of consumer spending and increased levels of household debt. When housing prices began to fall, mortgage and other loan
default rates increased as consumers found themselves unable to meet
their obligations. In certain cases, consumers declared themselves unaware of the true financial cost of some of the loans that they accepted so
easily when the market was more robust. While consumers bear much
responsibility for taking on such high levels of debt, there is also the recog-

nition that the financial industry, ranging from mortgage lenders and
credit card companies to investment advisers and brokers, benefited from
selling products and services to unsophisticated consumers, charging
these consumers high fees and commissions. As a result, there have been
calls for tougher consumer protection laws and an agency devoted to the
promulgation and enforcement of consumer protection regulation.4 3
The recent financial crisis supports the logic of twin peaks. In the run
up to the financial crisis, regulatory agencies in the United States and
United Kingdom demonstrated little concern for the needs of consumers
to better understand the financial services and products that they purchased. The Federal Reserve, for example, elected not to conduct consumer compliance examinations of certain bank holding companies as far
back as the late-1990s despite complaints raised by advocacy groups about
abusive lending practices to low income families.4 4 The Federal Reserve's
past performance raised concerns about the ability of a single agency to
balance appropriately its twin regulatory objectives.
In promoting a new, independent consumer protection agency with
powers that extend across the banking and nonbanking financial sectors,
the Obama White Paper represents an endorsement of the logic of twin
peaks. In the United Kingdom, the FSA and HM Treasury, however, appear reluctant to accept the logic of twin peaks, rejecting the Conservative
Party's call for a separate consumer protection agency. At the same time,
the European Commission has not suggested any structural reforms to
promote independent consumer protection agencies. To the extent that
consumer protection is vital to ensuring a sound financial market, policymakers must consider the validity of the twin peaks model.

43. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on Con-

sumer Financial Protection (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Consumer-Financial-Protec-

tion/ (explaining administration's reform efforts and emphasizing consumer pro-

tection through creation of Consumer Financial Protection Agency).
44. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn't Bother Barking, WASH. Posr., Sept. 27, 2009, at Al.
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Powers and Identity of the Systemic Risk Regulator

The United Kingdom, United States, and European Union also face
the challenge of deciding the appropriate role of the systemic risk regulator and who should fill this role. During the financial crisis, there was a
loss of confidence in the ability of certain financial institutions to meet
their obligations, leading to a credit market freeze and deleveraging. This
loss of confidence resulted from the massive losses that the largest financial institutions reported. These institutions mismanaged their investment
portfolios and allowed themselves to be overexposed to the subprime
mortgage market. Regulators were unprepared for these events because
they did not carefully monitor the economic and financial market trends
to see the growing threat to the stability of the financial markets caused by
the housing price bubble and the growth of the structured finance product markets.
Why were there no regulatory agencies watching for general threats
to the financial system? The Turner Review offered one answer. The
Bank of England (like most central banks) focused primarily on monetary
policy analysis. Its priorities were to keep inflation rates low and nurture
steady gross domestic product growth. The FSA (like most regulatory
agencies) concerned itself with the supervision of individual financial institutions rather than oversight of the financial system as a whole. 45 Neither
agency looked at, or felt it was one of its regulatory priorities to monitor,
the general stability of the financial markets.
The creation of a systemic risk regulator, however, poses two
problems. First, what powers should a systemic risk regulator have, and,
second, who should serve as the systemic risk regulator? In order to carry
out its objective, a systemic risk regulator must have the power to compel
and collect information about both general economic trends and financial
market activities. The power to collect such information alone would
make the systemic risk regulator the most powerful agency in a regulatory
system.4 6 Such an agency naturally would need to be able to demand that
financial institutions and market intermediaries disclose detailed information about their financial condition, trading activities, and investment
portfolios. It would need to have the ability to conduct inspections and
mandate financial institutions to follow certain internal control and risk
management practices. It would also need to be privy to all of the same
macroeconomic data currently collected and reviewed by central banks
45. See TURNER REvIEw, supra note 6, at 84. Charles Goodhart has noted that
in the late 1980s Japanese banks appeared individually strong and robust, but the

Japanese banking system was quite fragile when there was a sudden decline in asset
prices. See C.A.E. Goodhart, Some New Directions for Financial Stability? (June 27,
2004), in THE PERJACOBSON LECrURE, June 2004, at 5, available at http://www.per
jacobsson.org/lectures/062704.pdf.
46. Some fear that the concentration of monetary policy and prudential supervision in a single agency may create an entity too powerful for political oversight. See Masciandaro, supra note 38, at 163.
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making monetary policy. 4 7 Currently, no single agency in the United
States or European Union has the power to compel disclosure of all necessary information required by such a systemic risk regulator.
In addition to the power to collect information, a systemic risk regulator also must have the power to intervene in the financial markets when

there is a systemic threat. The tools of intervention would need to be varied and powerful, further increasing the regulator's authority. On one
hand, the systemic risk regulator must have all of the powers of a prudential supervisor. 48 It must be able to set capital adequacy rules and direct
individual financial institutions to modify their investment and lending
portfolios. Such prudential supervisory powers would be essential to mitigate the moral hazard problem. 49 On the other hand, the systemic risk
regulator must have the power to intervene in the markets in a time of
crisis. Such power would need to include the ability to serve as lender (or
guarantor) of last resort, the power to take over insolvent institutions, and
the ability to supply liquidity, extend credit, or make markets.
Central banks in general already have many of the responsibilities and
powers consistent with a systemic risk regulator.50 They monitor the condition of the general economy and serve as a lender of last resort. They
also have the resources to intervene in the financial markets. Most central
banks, including the European Central Bank and the Bank of England,
however, do not have supervisory capabilities. In these jurisdictions, separate prudential supervision agencies handle the task of financial institution supervision. 5 '
Alternatively, the main prudential supervisor could serve as the systemic risk regulator. This alternative is most attractive when there is al47. Cf Joe Peek et al., Is Bank Supervision Central to CentralBanking, 114 Q. J.
EcoN. 629 (1999) (arguing importance of giving central bank direct access to bank
supervisory information).
48. One of the challenges of the systemic risk regulator is to set capital ade-

quacy rules based upon the collective risk of failure rather than only on the risk of

failure of the individual bank. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk
and Design of PrudentialBank Regulation, 5 J. FIN. STABILTIY 224 (2009).
49. See Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?,47 OxFoRD ECON. PAPERS 539, 548-

49 (1995) (examining situations in which moral hazards may arise).
50. See, e.g., Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Should FinancialStability Be an Explicit Central Bank Objective?, in CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL BANKING FROM GLOBALIZED FINANCIAL SysTEMs 208 (Piero C. Ugolini et al. eds., 2003) (noting that one of

fundamental objectives of central banks is to ensure financial stability).
51. See Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 49, at 544, 558. The number of
separated monetary and supervisory agencies is greater than Goodhart and
Schoenmaker originally recorded. With the introduction of the euro in 1999, the

European Central Bank assumed the power to manage monetary policy for the
Euro-zone countries (initially Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), leaving national
authorities only with the responsibility of financial regulation. See Masciandaro,

supranote 38, at 159-60 (measuring degree of central bank's involvement in financial supervision).
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ready a single regulator like the FSA. A prudential regulator would be in
the best position to understand the conditions of financial institutions and
the financial markets. A prudential regulator also has expertise in collecting and analyzing information about market operations. But, prudential
regulators have little experience in monitoring general economic and
market trends and lack the market intervention powers enjoyed by central
banks.
A third alternative would be to make systemic regulation the job of a
committee (or "college" or "council") of agencies consisting of the central
bank and prudential supervisory agencies. A committee is attractive because it avoids the need to reallocate power among agencies and allows
each participant to focus on its area of specialty. The concern is that committees suffer from coordination problems. Committee members may not
share information in a timely fashion, the need for consensus may cause a
committee to be indecisive and sluggish, and the lack of a lead agency to
impose an agenda for decisions and actions may result in the committee
operating reactively rather than proactively in addressing systemic threats.
The United Kingdom, United States, and European Union are pursuing a combination of these approaches in identifying which agency should
serve as a systemic risk regulator. Under the HM Treasury proposal, the
new Council of Financial Stability, chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would monitor systemic risks, but it does not promote either the
Bank of England or the FSA as the primary systemic risk regulator. Instead, the HM Treasury White Paper recommended giving the FSA greater
prudential supervisory powers over the financial institutions and making it
explicit that one of the FSA's statutory objectives is to protect financial
stability. At the same time, HM Treasury wanted the Bank of England to
assume greater responsibility for monitoring general threats to financial
stability and, as part of its new mandate, the Bank of England would publish a semi-annual "Financial Stability Report." Thus, the U.K government (under the control of the Labour Party) sought to retain the
regulatory split between the Bank of England and the FSA, relying on a
new tripartite committee structure to ensure coordinated systemic risk regulation. The opposition Conservative Party, on the other hand, advocated
transferring responsibility for prudential supervision of financial institutions exclusively to the Bank of England. This proposal would give the
Bank of England all of the powers necessary to serve as the United Kingdom's only systemic risk regulator.
The European Commission submitted legislation to assign the task of
systemic risk regulation in the European Union to the newly created
ESRB. The ESRB would be a committee consisting of national representatives and EU-level officials. Central bankers would outnumber the prudential regulators in the ESRB. What is notable about the ESRB is that the
only voting members of the ESRB are central bankers with the exception
of the chairs of the three European Supervisory Authorities. Representa-
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tives from the member state prudential supervisors would have only observer status. By emphasizing the power of central banks to safeguard the
stability of the financial markets, the European Commission apparently
concluded that systemic risk regulation consists primarily of crisis management and response. The European Commission did not design the ESRB
to prevent or otherwise monitor financial risk that may produce a crisis.
The prudential supervisors who operate through the ESFS have the task of
ensuring the safety and soundness of the European Union's large financial
institutions.
In contrast to the EU approach, which emphasizes systemic crisis response, the U.S. approach to systemic risk regulation, as articulated in the
Obama White Paper, emphasizes prudential supervision and the prevention of systemic risk events. Like the United Kingdom and European
Union, the United States would conduct systemic risk regulation by committee-the Financial Services Oversight Council, chaired by the Treasury
Secretary. In practice, however, the primary U.S. systemic risk regulator
would be the Federal Reserve. In contrast to many of its foreign counterparts, the Federal Reserve is not only a central bank, but also a bank supervisor. As a result, the Federal Reserve is uniquely positioned to prevent,
monitor, and respond to systemic risk events. 52
The Obama White Paper proposed to strengthen systemic risk regulation by increasing the Federal Reserve's powers of prudential supervision.
First, all financial institutions of a certain size or level of interconnectedness would be classified as Tier 1 FHCs. These financial institutions do
not have to be depository institutions. Rather, they only need to be firms
whose size and connections to other firms make them systemically important. Second, all Tier 1 FHCs would become subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve. Working through the Financial Services
Oversight Council, the Federal Reserve would have the power to demand
reports from the Tier 1 FHCs, set prudential standards applicable to Tier 1
FHCs, restrict the activities of Tier 1 FHCs, and regulate any subsidiaries of
Tier 1 FHCs. The Obama White Paper made clear that these prudential
standards and requirements would be stricter than what is already imposed on non-Tier 1 FHC bank holding companies.
52. In Germany, the new ruling coalition announced that supervisory responsibility for German banks would shift from the BaFin to the Bundesbank. This
decision tracks the U.S. approach of combining systemic regulation in the hands
of a single agency with both prudential supervisory powers and market interven-

tion powers. See Beate Preuschoff & Andrea Thomas, Bigger Role Eyed for
Bundesbank, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2009, at A26. Belgium announced that it too will
give its central bank full responsibility for prudential supervision while tasking the
Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission with focusing on business conduct
and consumer protection regulation. See Press Release, Belgium Banking, Finance
and Insurance Commission and the National Bank of Belgium, New Organization
of the Supervision of Credit Institutions and of Financial Markets and Services

(Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.cbfa.be/eng/Press/html/2009-10-13_cbfa
Tbnb.asp.
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The approaches of each jurisdiction to the problem of systemic risk
regulation are not surprising when considered in the context of the jurisdictions' different experiences in the recent financial crisis. From the perspective of the Continental European countries, the financial crisis began
offshore, and they mainly faced the problem of attempting to limit the
effects of the crisis on their domestic financial markets. 5 3 As a result, the
European concern with systemic risk regulation focuses on crisis response.
From the perspective of the United States, the financial crisis was the result of adverse market events at home that devastated several large U.S.
financial institutions. Crisis response is not viewed as the problem. In
fact, one may argue that the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve acted decisively and effectively in supporting important financial institutions and
avoiding a widespread market meltdown. Instead, U.S. policymakers view
the financial crisis as a failure of prudential regulation. Consequently, the
U.S. approach toward systemic risk regulation focuses on tougher supervision of those firms deemed too-big-to-fail. The United Kingdom, under
the Labour government, was in the middle. Its experience with the financial crisis is similar to that of the United States. At the same time, the
United Kingdom already concentrates prudential supervision in the hands
of a single, powerful regulator. Thus, the Labour government was, not
surprisingly, reluctant to move around the deck chairs when there is no
reason to believe the Bank of England would do a better job than the FSA
in supervising large financial institutions. Instead, the U.K. government
proposal sought to give the FSA more tools to improve its supervisory efforts. The new Conservative-Liberal Democratic government, however, appears to take a different stance in favoring the consolidation of central
banking and prudential supervisory responsibilities in the Bank of
England.54
The U.S. approach (as well as the approach just announced by the
new U.K government) offers the greatest chance of success. A successful
systemic risk regulator must have the powers of a prudential regulator and
a central bank. The U.S. approach generally consolidates such power in
the Federal Reserve as opposed to dividing up systemic risk regulation
among multiple agencies. Some critics of the Obama White Paper question whether the Federal Reserve is the right agency to serve as the systemic risk regulator.5 5 Leaving aside the management challenge of
53. Consider, for example, the de Larosiere Report's analysis of the causes of
the financial crisis. While the report acknowledges the need to improve prudential regulation in both Europe and the United States, it makes clear its view that
the crisis began in the United States and was the product of U.S. policies and
market developments. See DE LAROsItRE REPORT, supra note 22, at 7-12.
54. For discussion of the Conservative-Liberal Democratic government's approach, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Establishinga Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (state-

ment of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
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leading such a large agency, it is questionable that a council of regulators
could carry out the functions of a systemic risk regulator better than a
single agency and, even if the Federal Reserve is not that agency, there
should be another agency that assumes the role.
One cautionary note, however, should be struck about making central
banks serve as systemic risk regulators. The larger the role that central
banks play in supervising the operations of financial institutions and providing support to troubled institutions, the greater the degree to which
they subject themselves to calls for greater political oversight.5 6 Central
banks, however, prize their independence and institutional secrecy. Such
characteristics are essential to their role as monetary authorities and lenders of last resort.5 7 Consequently, for many central banks the assumption
of responsibility for prudential supervision and monitoring systemic risk
may be a poisoned chalice.58 Policymakers need to be aware of this problem and balance the need for public oversight with the unique requirements of central banks.
D.

InternationalCooperation and Cross-BorderRegulation and Supervision

The fourth challenge of financial regulatory reform is achieving international cooperation for cross-border regulation and supervision. At their
summits in London and Pittsburgh in 2009, the G-20 leaders recognized
Hearings.Hearing&HearingID=dabb299b-02c3-4e4b-all6-0767b04768ff (expressing preference for council of regulators rather than Federal Reserve as entity responsible for systemic risk regulation); see also id. at 1-2 (statement of Sheila C.
Bair, Chairwoman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing
ID=dabb299b-02c3-4e4b-al 16-0767b04768ff; Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, The Fed
Can't Monitor "Systemic Risk, "WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2009, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203440104574400842635317778.html.
56. See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy, Congress Grows Fed Up Despite CentralBank's Push,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, at All (describing proposals in Congress to subject
Federal Reserve to tighter congressional oversight).
57. See, e.g., Stanley Fischer, Central-Bank Independence Revisited, 85 Am. EcoN.
REv. 201 (1995); Kenneth Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, 100 Q.J. ECON. 1169 (1985).
58. Goodhart and Schoenmaker have long noted that central banks risk their
reputations when they assume responsibility for prudential supervision.
Moreover, there may often be a gap between the expectations of the public about the role of a banking supervisor, i.e., that no-one should ever
lose part of their deposit as a result of a bank failure, and the objective of
the supervisors, i.e., to prevent systemic collapse and to alleviate asymmetric information by the partial protection of ill-informed clients. Consequently, it has been argued that the reputation of the central bank is
more likely to suffer than to benefit from the joint conduct of both functions. The potentially adverse reputational effect on the central bank as
an institution that may, almost necessarily, be incurred as a consequence
of conducting banking supervision is now becoming widely recognised, at
least among central banks.
Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 49, at 548.
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that financial crises can no longer be assumed to remain local.59 As a
result, cooperation among national supervisors is necessary to regulate
and supervise financial institutions that operate and provide services
across borders and to respond quickly and effectively to systemic risk
events. What remains unanswered is how such an improvement in international cooperation can be achieved.
The need for greater international cooperation and stronger crossborder regulation and supervision begins with the problem of home versus host country supervision. Oversight of multinational financial institutions generally follows the principle of consolidated home country
supervision. 60 For instance, the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority
(IFSA) had responsibility for supervising the consolidated operations of
Icelandic banks and their branches in foreign countries. Regulators in
host jurisdictions relied on the IFSA, as home country supervisor, to monitor the soundness of these banks. To the extent that host jurisdictions
accepted consolidated home country supervision, financial institutions
were able to expand aggressively and offer a range of services to clients
outside their home jurisdiction.
Since the recent financial crisis, certain host country supervisors have
questioned the ability of home country supervisors to adequately supervise
foreign branches and to protect the interests of foreign customers.6 1 In
the Turner Review, for example, the FSA called for host country supervisors to play a more significant role in supervising local branches of foreign
59. See Leaders' Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, (Sept. 24-25, 2009), avail-

able at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-summit-leaders-statement 25
0909.pdf.
60. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR
THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTs 1, 4 (1983), availableat http:/
/www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc3l2.pdf. For further discussion of this point, see infra
note 68 and accompanying text.
61. U.K officials have expressed concern with the principle of home country
supervision after the collapse of several Icelandic banks put billions of pounds of
deposits made by U.K residents at risk. See, e.g., Verena Ross, Director of Strategy
and Risk, U.K Financial Services Authority, Speech at the Chatham House Conference on Global Financial Regulation (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0324_vr.shtml.
The failure of the Icelandic banks has demonstrated that current arrangements, and in particular the current home/host framework of sharing supervisory responsibility are unsustainable. As a reminder, the
current arrangements combine branch passporting rights, home country
supervision and purely home-country based deposit insurance. This setup, using the Icelandic banking crisis as an example meant that Landsbanki was free to operate in the United Kingdom as a branch over which

the FSA only had limited powers, as responsibility for its prudential super-

vision rested with the Icelandic regulator. U.K depositors were also later
dependent on the Icelandic deposit insurance scheme, with resources
that proved inadequate and requiring the intervention of the U.K
authorities.
Id.
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financial institutions.6 2 Host jurisdictions' desire to supervise foreign financial institutions stems from their interest in protecting the impact of a
financial institution's failure on domestic consumers, investors, and
counterparties.6 3
Weakening or abandoning the principle of home country supervision, however, could lead to market fragmentation and higher regulatory
costs. If host country supervisors refuse to defer to the home country supervisor, cross-border financial institutions will find themselves subject to
oversight by multiple supervisors. As the interest of each national supervisor will be to ensure that a financial institution maintains adequate capital
in its local branch at all times or, in a developing crisis, refuse to allow a
bank to transfer capital from one branch to another in a foreign jurisdiction, the effect of host country supervision would likely be to force all
branches to operate as bank subsidiaries, separately regulated and capitalized.64 Such an effect would make it difficult for financial institutions to
conduct business across borders and stifle international financial markets,
to ensure efficient capital allocation between branches.
The best way to avoid the problems associated with host country supervision is to ensure intensive cooperation among national supervisors.
This degree of cooperation would require a greater commitment by national supervisors to work with their foreign counterparts than what has
been shown to date, and ultimately would require a commitment to supporting new and more powerful international administrative regimes.65
Cross-border supervision and regulation consists of two tasks: harmonization and cooperation. Harmonization refers to the task of narrowing
differences between national regulatory regimes. Such acts include agreeing upon rules and establishing common standards. Harmonization, however, is a static process. Progress on harmonization takes place on a
periodic basis through informal and formal agreements and works best
when regulators are attempting to agree on an ex ante rule that must be
implemented across jurisdictions. International bodies, such as the Basel
Committee or the International Organization of Securities Commissions
62. See TURNER REVIEw, supra note 6, at 100-01.
63. Implicit in the principle of home country supervision is the notion that a
bank's capital will be transferred between jurisdictions as necessary to meet local
demands. During the recent financial crisis, however, concerns about multi-jurisdictional demands on a failing bank's dwindling assets incited host regulators to
freeze assets to ensure sufficient capital remains to pay off local obligations. See,
e.g., Press Release, HM Treasury, Landsbanki, Heritable, and Kaupthing Singer
and Friedlander (Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press
103 08.htm. Such acts undermine the home country regulator's ability to offer
credible supervision of the bank.

64. During a crisis, host country supervisors would be in a competitive position relative to other supervisors. See Eugenio Cerutti et al., How Banks Go Abroad:
Branches or Subsidiaries?,31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1669, 1670 (2007).
65. See Pan, Challenge, supra note 3, at 1; see also David Zaring, International
InstitutionalPerformance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475 (2010) (analyzing performance of existing international law institutions in recent financial crisis).
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(IOSCO), that host meetings of national representatives play a crucial role
in lowering the cost of regulatory coordination and harmonization. 6 6
Cooperation, on the other hand, refers to a more dynamic relationship between regulators. Cooperating regulators do not operate independently of each other. Rather they are co-dependent. They must share
information in real-time and make decisions in consultation with one another. Cooperation describes a relationship that is better suited to the
task of supervising financial institutions as opposed to making rules and
agreeing upon supervisory standards.
One proposal to promote cooperation by national regulators regarding the supervision of cross-border financial institutions is a college of supervisors. 6 7 Such a college would consist of representatives of each host
country supervisor with a lead role reserved for the home country supervisor. The success of such an arrangement depends on the willingness of
national supervisors to share information with each other, the efficiency of
decision-making, and ability to enforce implementation of college decisions. Past attempts at having a college of supervisors oversee multijurisdictional financial institutions have had mixed results, and ironically the
push to strengthen home country supervision stemmed from the perceived failures of one such college of supervisors.68 Thus, there are reasons to be skeptical that colleges of supervisors will generate the level of
cooperation needed to effectively oversee large, cross-border financial
institutions.

66. See generallyKal Raustiala, The Architecture of InternationalCooperation:Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002)
(exploring how governments and private actors work to create and sustain harmonization and cooperation). For a description of how the Basel Committee and
IOSCO have been used by regulators to harmonize capital adequacy standards for
banks and securities firms, see David Andrew Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic
Politics of InternationalRegulatory Harmonization,58 INT'L ORG. 531 (2004).
67. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 6, at 97-99 (endorsing Financial Stability
Forum's proposal for colleges of supervisors to regulate cross-border financial
institutions).
68. A college of supervisors, consisting of representatives from several countries in which BCCI operated, including the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands, oversaw BCCI. The Basel Committee faulted the
college for absence of leadership and problems in coordination and communication between regulators about BCCI's international operations and proposed new
standards that emphasized the role of the home country in providing consolidated
supervision. See BASEL COMMITTEE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENT 3, 7
(1992). In 1997, the Basel Committee published the "Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision," which provided more guidance on the supervision of multijurisdictional bank holding companies. The home country supervisor of the bank
parent is responsible for monitoring the risk exposure and capital adequacy of the
bank group. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECnTvE BANKING SUPERVISION (1997), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs30.pdf.
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I make two very preliminary observations about how to establish a
stronger cooperative relationship between regulators.6 9 First, the optimal
conditions for cooperation between regulators occurs when there is a preexisting mutual understanding between regulators that comes about
through familiarity with each other's regulatory frameworks, markets, and
regulatory approaches. Thus, it is more likely for regulators to cooperate
in an effective manner if they focus on developing bilateral, as opposed to
multilateral, cooperative relationships. Cooperation will best take place if
there is both harmonization of standards (i.e., coordination as a prerequisite of cooperation) and commonality of regulatory interests and philosophies.7 0 To this end, the logical partner of the United States is the
European Union. 7 1 Furthermore, given the size of the U.S. and EU financial markets, any cooperative regulatory framework relationship that develops between the United States and European Union will set the dominant
framework for prudential supervision of cross-border institutions for the
rest of the world.7 2
Second, even strong bilateral cooperation would be second-best to an
international administrative body. An international administrative body
would serve as a global prudential regulator with powers to reach across
69. See Pan, Challenge, supra note 3, at 1.
70. An example of the challenges that underlie efforts to promote regulatory
cooperation is the recent attempt by the SEC to negotiate mutual recognition arrangements with Australia, Canada, and the European Union concerning the supervision of broker-dealers and exchanges. The mutual recognition arrangements
would have allowed foreign broker-dealers to provide investor services based upon
home country supervisory approvals. As a precondition to granting mutual recognition treatment to a foreign firm, the SEC had to determine whether the laws and
regulations of the home country were "substantively comparable" to U.S. laws and
regulations and whether the home country regulator had oversight powers and a
regulatory and enforcement philosophy "substantively similar" to the SEC's. The
SEC had difficulty making such a successful determination for more than a handful of countries. See Eric J. Pan, The New Internationalizationof U.S. Securities Regulation: Improving the Prospectsfor a Trans-Atlantic Marketplace, 5 EUR. COMPANY L. 73
(2008). The SEC ultimately entered into only one mutual recognition agreement
(with Australia). See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC,
Australian Authorities Sign Mutual Recognition Agreement (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-182.htm.
71. For a discussion of the importance of bilateral regulatory cooperation between the United States and European Union see George A. Bermann, Regulatory
CooperationBetween the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 933 (1996).
72. Thoughts turn to the mid-1980s when the United States and United Kingdom became frustrated with, and abandoned, efforts to negotiate a single capital
adequacy standard through the G-10. They instead entered into a bilateral agreement on a capital adequacy standard. Given the size of the U.S. and U.K. banking
markets, the other G-10 countries understood that the U.S.-U.K. capital adequacy
standard constituted the de facto global standard. As a result, within a year of the
announcement of a U.S.-U.K. agreement, the rest of the G-10 joined negotiations
to produce the first Basel Accord. See Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, Between Power and
Purpose: CentralBankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence, 46 Iwr'L ORG. 265
(1992).
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jurisdictional lines. A global body would overcome many of the weaknesses of ad hoc consultations between national supervisors or even a
more formal college of supervisors. While such a supranational body remains in the realm of legal fantasy, many have argued the benefits of international bodies. 73 It is especially helpful to look at the EU proposal of a
European-wide supervisory system as a model of international cooperation. The proposed ESAs represent a significant step forward from the
non-binding, consensus-based Lamfalussy committees. The ESAs will have
rulemaking power, qualified majority voting decision-making, dispute resolution procedures to discipline non-complying members, and a permanent staff of regulators. Such powers represent a transfer of supervisory
responsibility and authority away from national regulators to the EU level.
The success of the ESAs would offer important lessons for efforts to create
a comparable body outside the European Union.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In considering the various reform proposals the United Kingdom,
United States, and European Union have put forward, we must consider
whether these reforms will be effective in preventing future financial crises. While the reform proposals under consideration neatly address the
regulatory weaknesses revealed by the recent financial crisis, they would
have benefited from more careful contemplation of the optimal structure
of financial regulation. Reorganization of regulatory agencies gives the
impression of great change, but such change will be hollow if reorganization is not accompanied by better regulation, supervision, and
enforcement.
Already there are reasons to be concerned that policymakers (and
their constituents) have become distracted by symbolic changes rather
than substantive reform. In the United States, for example, critics of the
Obama White Paper have questioned whether it is wise to give the Federal
Reserve a greater role in supervising systemically-important financial institutions because the Federal Reserve was slow to anticipate and recognize
the weaknesses of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and other troubled firms in the recent financial crisis. Similarly, critics of the Turner Review and HM Treasury Report in the United Kingdom have opposed
giving more power and resources to the FSA because the FSA by its own
admission failed to properly supervise certain major U.K. financial institutions. Many of these critics have suggested transferring responsibility to
other agencies or creating new agencies in the hope that new blood will
73. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998) (calling
for development of international deposit insurance corporation); Jeffrey Garten,
Op-Ed, In This Economic Chaos, A Global Central Bank Can Help, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 25, 1998, at 8 (calling for global prudential regulator); Henry Kaufman,
Opinion, Preventing the Next Global Financial Crisis, WASH. Posr., Jan. 28, 1998, at
Al 7 (same). See also Eric J. Pan, Authoritative Interpretation of Agreements: Developing
More Responsive InternationalAdministrative Regimes, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503 (1997).
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invigorate the regulatory system. At the end of the day it does not matter
which agency in name is responsible for a particular area of regulation.
Instead, it is important to ensure that there is an agency responsible and
that it receives adequate resources, information, and legal powers to carry
out its responsibilities. This is a management challenge.
For purposes of structural regulatory reform it is necessary to understand the function of regulatory agencies, and how they interact with one
another and with their foreign counterparts. Such an understanding requires policymakers to confront the four challenges to regulatory reform
identified in this Article. The fact that the United Kingdom, United
States, and European Union have produced different answers to the challenges outlined in this Article, suggests that much more work needs to be
done to complete the task of regulatory reform successfully.
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